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The Ebb and Flow of Muslim Politics in West Bengal The Humayun Kabir Gambit

  • Writer: priyamadam77
    priyamadam77
  • 1 day ago
  • 4 min read

Berhampore, the administrative heart of Murshidabad district in West Bengal, is known for its historic industries silk weaving, oilseed milling, and metal crafts. But on December 6, the town found itself at the centre of a political storm that echoed the layered complexities of identity politics in the state.

A 12-kilometre stretch of National Highway 12, between Rejinagar and Beldanga, was blocked for nearly three hours as thousands gathered to witness suspended Trinamool MLA Humayun Kabir lay the foundation stone for a “Babri Masjid-styled” mosque. The symbolism of December 6 the day the Babri Masjid was demolished in Ayodhya in 1992 was no coincidence.

Humayun Kabir addressing supporters during the foundation stone event for a Babri Masjid-style mosque in Beldanga.
Suspended Trinamool MLA Humayun Kabir lays the foundation for a Babri Masjid style mosque in Beldanga, igniting political debate and signalling a new challenge in West Bengal’s Muslim vote landscape.

Kabir, 62, a seasoned and controversial figure in Bengal politics, now plans to construct a Babri Masjid model in Beldanga, an area still recovering from communal clashes earlier this year. He has also announced his intention to float a new political party by December 22 without resigning from the Trinamool to retain his MLA privileges.


A Political Chameleon With National Ambitions


Humayun Kabir’s political journey has spanned multiple parties:

  • 2015: Expelled from Trinamool for anti-party activities

  • 2016: Contested as an Independent from Rejinagar, lost

  • 2019: Joined BJP, contested Lok Sabha elections, lost

  • 2021: Returned to Trinamool; later won the Bharatpur seat by over 42,000 votes

Now Kabir claims he will contest 135 seats in 2026 and reshape Bengal’s political landscape. He has also claimed talks with AIMIM, ISF, Congress, and CPI(M), though most parties have chosen silence and AIMIM has outright denied any alliance.


“I will be a game changer. I will work for Muslims. I will become the new Owaisi of Bengal,” Kabir declared.


Identity Politics and the Muslim Vote


Kabir’s pitch targets the deep fractures and aspirations within Bengal’s Muslim electorate a demographic the Trinamool has historically depended upon for its electoral dominance.

Muslims constitute 27% of West Bengal’s population, with concentrations in:

  • Murshidabad – 66.3%

  • Malda – 51.3%

  • Uttar Dinajpur – 49.9%

  • Birbhum – 37%

  • South 24-Parganas – 35.6%

Political observers argue that current minority percentages are likely higher than the 2011 Census figures.


In contrast to Bihar’s fragmented Muslim identity groups Surjapuri, Shershahbadi, Kulhaiya Bengal’s Muslims are largely Bengali speaking, with Urdu-speaking communities concentrated in urban pockets like Kolkata’s Rajabazar. Economic lives in such Muslim-dominated localities revolve around informal sectors such as embroidery, leather craft, paper work, and driving.


The Trinamool has built its Muslim vote base on development schemes, welfare, and a secular image. But with mounting discontent and communal anxieties, Kabir believes he can tap into a new reservoir of sentiment.


Bihar’s Lessons and Bengal’s Dilemma


Kabir’s political blueprint borrows heavily from the successes of AIMIM in Bihar’s Seemanchal region, where Asaduddin Owaisi united distinct linguistic Muslim groups and secured multiple assembly seats in 2020 and 2025.


Political scientists point to two influential frameworks:

Yale Professor Harry W. Blair’s Theory


  • When Muslims form a decisive bloc (e.g., Murshidabad, Malda), they vote based on identity.

  • When scattered, they vote like the majority population.

  • When between 20–30%, they prefer a “secular” party—historically CPI(M)/Congress, now Trinamool.


Harvard Researcher Feyaad Allie’s Observations


  • Since 2019, Indian Muslims increasingly vote against the BJP as a defensive strategy.

  • Internal divisions remain, but anti-BJP consolidation is strong.

Kabir’s entry could disrupt this consolidation. A 10–15% shift in Muslim votes—even if speculative—could reshape tightly contested constituencies and indirectly benefit the BJP.


The Symbolism of the Babri Masjid


Kabir’s decision to model the new mosque after the Babri Masjid taps into deep emotional and political currents. Sociologist Avijit Pathak notes emerging cultural shifts, such as increasing visibility of burkha-clad women, marking a transformation in Muslim identity expression in districts like Malda.

For many, the Babri Masjid represents more than a structure it symbolizes memory, grievance, and identity. Kabir’s move is crafted to resonate with precisely these emotions.


Can Kabir Damage Trinamool’s Fortress?


Trinamool still retains a well-oiled political machinery led by Mamata Banerjee and Abhishek Banerjee. Despite anti incumbency, the party maintains control over district-level governance and grassroots networks.

Yet, cracks are visible:

  • Disenchantment in Muslim-majority districts

  • Local grievances

  • Communal tensions

  • Rising influence of AIMIM and ISF in pockets

Kabir’s presence even if limited could cut a few thousand votes in key seats and alter outcomes.


The Road to 2026: A Battle of Identity, Power, and Sentiment


Kabir believes he will be the “kingmaker” in 2026. Whether this is political bravado or a coming reality depends on how deeply he can tap into frustration, aspirations, and communal identity.


West Bengal’s political landscape, like its riverine terrain, is fluid and unpredictable. A single spark can shift the tide. Kabir’s gambit may emerge as a fleeting ripple or it may introduce a new chapter in the state’s Muslim political expression.


For now, the Trinamool watches warily, the BJP waits strategically, and Bengal’s Muslim electorate stands at the crossroads of history, identity, and political reinvention.

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